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Abstract 
The ubiquity of the phrase “tragedy of the commons” signals its wide, and often uncritical, 
acceptance. Without predictable and enforceable property rights, who will maintain or improve 
their land? Elinor Ostrom offered an eloquent answer to this question, suggesting that 
governance of commons may occur on the basis of informal rules that can be effective when 
stakeholders believe they are fairly adaptable to changing conditions. Intellectual property has 
attracted a similar assumption that in the absence of exclusionary rights to prevent others from 
copying, making, or using inventions without permission, owners will no longer engage in 
innovative or creative endeavors. However, as Frischmann, Madison, and Strandburg have 
demonstrated, socially beneficial governance of intangible, intellectual resources too may be 
effective without recourse to traditional intellectual property, via norms, community standards, 
and democratized participation. The assumption that commons tend to descend into tragedy is 
difficult to test empirically, which has made it challenging to evaluate claims concerning that 
assumption. This chapter presents a case study that offers a rare opportunity to evaluate what can 
happen to rates of innovation in the absence of intellectual property protection.  
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